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ABSTRACT
The internet has gone from being a small network of niche uses and mostly academic interest to
being a vital, foundational, piece of modern infrastructure that the world depends on. Because of
its importance, the internet has also become a target and a gateway for malicious entities. Indeed, it
has spawned a whole new military dimension: cyberwarefare. Of vital importance to both attackers
and defenders is the identification of vulnerable systems connected to the internet.
OS Fingerprinting is one mechanism by which vulnerable systems may be detected. Despite
the importance and proliferation of OS Fingerprinting tools, there has not been a systematic effort
to evaluate the effectiveness of such tools. We propose dimensionality as a metric for evaluating OS
Fingerprinting Systems and provide a Framework to calculate this value. In addition, we identify
NMAP as being the premier OS Fingerprinting tool used today and apply our Framework to this
tool under various distortions to ascertain its performance based on our metric of dimensionality.
Under it’s default conditions NMAP struggles with Firewalls, which are abundant on the inter-
net, and performs poorly. Our Framework can identify confounding signatures within the database
which disproportionately harm NMAPs dimensionality and can remove them from the database.
Further, we find that NMAP has modest struggles with network jitter, potentially even on local
networks. This, combined with NMAPs difficulty with Firewalls suggests that it is ill suited to the
task of Fingerprinting Operating Systems over the internet. Lastly, we identify which features are
crucial to NMAPs ability to identify Operating Systems. This, in addition to our other findings,
potentially points in the directions for improvements to NMAP, both in it’s ability to identify an
OS over the internet, and in reducing the number of probes needed to do so.
ii
DEDICATION
To Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, long may she reign. To my dear friends who kept
me sane. And to my family, who was always there for me.
iii
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES
Contributors
This work was supported by a thesis committee consisting of Professor Dmitri Loguinov as
Chair and Professor Riccardo Bettati of the Department of Computer Science and Professor A. L.
Narasimha Reddy of the Department of Electrical Engineering as Committee Members.
A partially complete version of zSignature was provided by Zain Shamsi. Further, zScan code
used to run an internet wide firewall probe was also provided by Zain Shamsi with the networking
driver written by Yue Zhuo; though code used to parse and interpret the results was conducted by
the student.
All other work conducted for the thesis was completed by the student independently.
Funding Sources
Graduate study was primarily self-funded with some departmental funds provided in the form
of a TA position for two semesters.
Computing Resources
Portions of this research were conducted with high performance research computing resources




ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. UNDERSTANDING NMAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 The NMAP Probes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Formal Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.1 More Features, More Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3.2 Tomato Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. NEMESIS DATABASE REDUCTION AND DIMENSIONALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. NEMESIS NMAP CORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.1 Feature Distortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.1 Picking Reasonable Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.1.2 Running the Distortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.1.3 Which Fields Are Worth Distorting? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.2 Jitter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.2.1 Jitter Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.2.2 Effect of Jitter on RTT Sensitive Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5. INTERNET WIDE FIREWALL PROBE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. CONFOUNDING SIGNATURES AND THEIR EFFECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6.1 Visualizing a Confounding Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
v
6.2 How Many Signatures Are Confounding? What Effect Do They Have on Dimen-
sionality? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
7. THE EFFECT OF FIREWALLS ON DIMENSIONALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.1 Running Reductions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
7.2 Lowering the Weight Given to Probe Non-Responsiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
8. FEATURE IMPACT ON DIMENSIONALITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.1 Reduction under Distortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2 Distortion Caused by High Load . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
9. ZSIGNATURE EMULATOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.1 Conclusions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
10.2 Further Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
APPENDIX A. NMAP DATABASE MINUTIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.1 NMAP Brief Feature Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.2 The Confounding Tomato . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.3 A Windows Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
APPENDIX B. FIREWALL CONFIGURATION EXPLANATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59




2.1 What a Windows Signature looks like in the NMAP database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1 Nemesis Reduction Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1 NMAP DB Feature Entropy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2 Signature selfmatch average when only one feature is distorted in the RAC SYN
case with 0.0225 confound maximum. Features that do not affect selfmatch truncated. 20
4.3 Signature selfmatch average when only one feature is distorted under various Fire-
wall scenarios. Features that do not affect selfmatch truncated. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.4 NMAP measurements subject to jitter due to difference between True-Delta and
Measured-Delta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1 A brief explanation of the labels in figure 5.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5.2 Internet Wide NMAP Scan Probe Response Odds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.1 Nemesis Reduction Matrix under no distortion and under a SE firewall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.2 Share of signatures confounded by an NMAP DB Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3 Amount of NMAP DB Signatures remaining after running a Column (Confound)
Reduction, followed by a Row (Weakness) Reduction. Firewalls, either S or SE




2.1 Various NMAP probes and a brief description of the packet sent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Comparison of Windows and Tomato Signatures against the same Windows ma-
chine when behind a SYN-Only Firewall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1 How often the [SP, ISR, GCD] fields match after being subjected to varying levels
of jitter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1 Share of signatures surviving a RAC Reduction given a SYN-Only Firewall and
given confound scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
6.2 Number of Confounding Signatures dropped under various Firewall conditions.
Consult Appendix B for Firewall configuration explanations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.1 Net size of Database after running a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under vari-
ous firewall conditions. Consult Appendix B for Firewall configuration explanations. 37
7.2 Net size of Database after running a Column-Based (confound) reduction followed
by a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under various firewall conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7.3 Net size of Database after running a Column-Based (confound) reduction followed
by a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under various firewall conditions with probe
response weight (R) set to 20. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
8.1 Distort Profiles which define which NMAP features will be distorted. Consult
Appendix A.1 for brief explanation of features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
8.2 Number of Remaining Signatures in NMAP database after running Row-Based
reduction with distortion profile and S Firewall. Column-Based reduction on S
Firewall was run first with 0.0225 as confound threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8.3 Number of Remaining Signatures in NMAP database after running Row-Based
reduction with distortion profile and SE Firewall. Column-Based reduction on SE
only Firewall was run first with 0.001 as the confound threshold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8.4 Number of Remaining Signatures in NMAP database after running Row-Based
reduction with various distortion profiles and Firewall rules. Confound reduction
done first with applicable Firewall rules.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
viii
8.5 Net size of Database after running a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under var-
ious Jitter Conditions (Scale & Shape define Pareto variable parameters). In all
cases, IP ID was distorted to Random (RD).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
ix
1. INTRODUCTION
The internet has grown from being a small experimental computer network to being a vital
piece of infrastructure for the modern world. Its importance is on par with that of electricity and
arguably more important than the telephone or postal system. As the internet has grown in im-
portance, so has the incentive to exploit vulnerable devices on the internet. By finding vulnerable
systems, hackers can pilfer the financial information of 10s-100s of millions of individuals [1],
cripple hospital systems with randsomware [2], and create botnets spanning millions of computers
[3]. Generally, the responsibility for securing systems falls to the owners of the physical machines,
regardless of how well qualified or equipped those owners are. Given that most users of internet-
connected devices are not security experts, there is considerable concern surrounding the general
cybersecurity readiness of the internet at large. Indeed, the Government of Japan considers the
situation so dire that the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications will be con-
ducting a mass hack of vulnerable Internet of Things (IoT) devices within it’s borders in an effort
to secure them ahead of the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo [4].
Both attackers and defenders need tools to categorize and identify vulnerable machines oper-
ating on the internet. Defenders may wish to do a census of devices on the internet to gauge the
scale of vulnerable devices and to identify them for possible remediation. Attackers also wish to
do a census of vulnerable devices to find targets for exploits. One key piece of knowledge about
said machines is what Operating System (OS) it is running. The vulnerabilities of a Windows
desktop machine are generally different from those of a smart fridge. The process of identifying
the OS of a remote machine is called Operating System Fingerprinting. There are quite a few OS
Fingerprinting tools available today, including Ettercap [5], p0f [6], and NMap [7]; though both
Ettercap and p0f are only capable of identifying the OS of systems running on a local network and
not the internet at large. Indeed, identifying Operating Systems on a local network is considerably
easier than on the open internet. If the devices are on the same physical link layer then the MAC
address is exposed and identifying the device may be as simple as looking up the network card
1
manufacturer by MAC address; this is especially true if the device is an IoT or smartphone device
with a custom network card. Even if the MAC address is not visible, devices on LAN tend to have
no serious security between them: probes tend not to be blocked, network congestion tends to be
minimal, etc. And if all else fails, one can simply walk over to said LAN device and identify it
by visual inspection. Meanwhile, almost all internet connected devices can be expected to have
firewalls in place, MAC addresses will be unavailable, network congestion unpredictable. Identify-
ing the OS of an internet connected device is considerably more difficult, not least because visual
inspection of said device is generally not possible, let alone practical.
Despite the difficulty of running OS Fingerprinting on the open internet, there does exist a stan-
dard widely used tool to do so: Network MAPper (NMAP) [7]. Indeed, the NMAP OS Classifier
is the de-facto standard for OS classification; it essentially serves as the ground truth for most OS
classification tasks. Large internet fingerprinting scans typically either rely on NMAP directly [8]
or on connection-less OS Fingerprinting which gauges its effectiveness against NMAP [9]. Indeed,
so undisputed is NMAPs reign, that almost any paper touching on OS Fingerprinting or Honey-
potting must, at the very least, mention it [10, 11, 12, 13]. Further, when systems are designed to
defend against OS Fingerprinting, their effectiveness against NMAP is mentioned [14, 15]. That
being said, despite NMAPs reign, there is relatively limited literature regarding the effectiveness
and correctness of NMAP.
We propose the Nemesis Framework to evaluate the effectiveness of OS Fingerprinting tools
which are intended for internet wide OS Scans. Our key metric of effectiveness will be the di-
mensionality of the fingerprinting database. A low dimensionality implies that few devices can be
reasonably differentiated, whilst a high dimensionality implies that many devices can be reason-
ably differentiated; the higher the dimensionality, the more effective the classifier. The Framework
is capable of simulating three main types of distortions: firewalls, network jitter, and user modifi-
cation of features. Firewalls are relatively common on the internet and many systems come with
them enabled by default. They manifest by a total blocking of a probe. Network jitter can sub-
tly distort probe features that depend on the Round Trip Time (RTT) of the probe. The internet
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operates on a “best effort” principle and transit times will vary depending on network congestion,
network routing, OS load, et cetera, which inevitably result in variations in the RTT of a packet.
Finally, users may sometimes tweak the parameters of their network stack, either in an attempt to
improve performance, or to intentionally make their system more difficult to fingerprint. While
our dimensionality calculator is, generally speaking, fingerprinter agnostic, we will be targeting
NMAP as a practical matter; both to demonstrate the effectiveness of our tool and because NMAP
is the de-facto OS Fingerprinting standard.
3
2. UNDERSTANDING NMAP
NMap is a large tool that does more than just OS Fingerprinting. It’s main overall goal is
vulnerability detection, of which Fingerprinting is just a small part. In the context of this work,
only the components directly related to OS Fingerprinting are relevant. Therefore, we will restrict
our discussion of NMAP to the probes it sends when fingerprinting an OS as well as the classifier
itself.
When NMAP operates in OS classifier mode, it generally first does a port scan to find one open
TCP port and one closed TCP port. This is actually a fairly intensive scan, but can be avoided
by specifying which ports to scan. Thereafter, NMAP sends 16 unique probes out, which are
listed in Table 2.1 and further described in Section 2.1. The responses to these probes are then
placed into a NMAP signature struct. This struct does, in fact, have a human readable version, an
example is displayed in Figure 2.1. Please note that this is a signature from the NMAP database,
a measurement obtained from a scan does not have ranges for values. So for “SP=FC-106” during
an NMAP scan of said system, the result would be a single hexadecimal number, hopefully within
the expected range. To understand the meaning of all of the features (such as SP, DF, etc.) it is
recommended that one read the NMAP documentation on the matter located at [16]. However, a
brief description is also available in Appendix A.1. Once NMAP receives responses to its probes,
or the probes time out, it passes the results struct to the NMAP OS Classifier.
Probenum Explanation
1-6 Valid TCP SYN packets to open port with various options
7-9 Various invalid TCP packets to open ports
10-12 Various TCP packets to closed ports
13 Valid TCP SYN packet to open port with ECN flag set
14-15 ICMP Echo packets
16 UDP packet to closed port
Table 2.1: Various NMAP probes and a brief description of the packet sent
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Figure 2.1: What a Windows Signature looks like in the NMAP database
The NMAP OS Classifier is rather simple. The classifier looks through each category in the DB
entry (reference signature) and compares it against the same category in the captured measurement.
Each individual test within the category, for example the Window (W) test, is then compared
against the measurement. If it is a match, NMAP increments a “NumMatchPoint” counter. The
amount of points incremented is governed by the MatchPoints structure defined in the NMAP
database. This structure is global for all entries in the database.
Once all tests and categories of tests are compared, “NumMatchPoint” is divided by the amount
of “PossiblePoints.” Note that if a test, like the Window (W) test, is not in the reference signature
or the measurement, the test is skipped and the amount of points assigned to that test by the
MatchPoints structure is not included in the number of “PossiblePoints.” In effect, not including a
test, like the Window (W) test, turns that test into a wildcard. Thus, reference signatures with few
tests will match against most measurements and will pollute the results of the NMAP OS Classifier.
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2.1 The NMAP Probes
Note that for probes 7-12 the probes have TCP Options set in the following order: Window
Scale (10), NOP, MSS (265), Timestamp, SACK permitted. Expected responses to probes 1-6
and 13 are TCP packets with the SYN and ACK flags set. Expected responses to probes 7-12 are
TCP packets with the RST flag set as those probes are not valid packets in that context. Expected
response to probes 14 and 15 are ICMP ECHO Replies. Expected response to probe 16 is an ICMP
Port Unreachable message.
1-6. A valid TCP packet with the SYN flag set sent to an open port. The next 5 packets are the
same. All of them have the Timestamp and MSS TCP Options. The order of TCP Options
and number of NOP options vary, as do the Window and MSS values. The first probe is used
to set the parameters for the T1 test, whereas all the probes (1-6) are used to set the SEQ
(TCP ISN Generation tests), OPS (TCP Options), and WIN (TCP Window Size) tests.
7. A TCP packet with no flags set sent to an open port. This is for the T2 test.
8. A TCP Rainbow packet sent to an open port, rainbow meaning that several conflicting TCP
flags are set. In this instance, the TCP flags set are SYN, FIN, URG, PSH flags. This is for
the T3 test.
9. A TCP packet with the ACK flag set sent to an open port. This is for the T4 test.
10. A TCP packet with the SYN flag set sent to a closed port. This is for the T5 test.
11. A TCP packet with the ACK flag set sent to a closed port. This is for the T6 test.
12. A TCP Rainbow packet sent to a closed port. In this instance, the TCP flags set are FIN,
PSH, URG. This is for the T7 test.
13. A valid TCP packet with the SYN and ECN flags set sent to an open port. The ECN flag is
somewhat escoteric, it’s for Explicit Congestion Notification. The receiving system is free
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to ignore the ECN flag if it does not support it. This is for the ECN test and should be looked
at in the same context as T1 test.
14. An ICMP Echo Request with the Code field set to 9. Note that according to the standard [17]
an ICMP Echo Request must have it’s Code field set to 0, making this a malformed ICMP
Echo Request. That being said, most Operating Systems simply do not check the Code field
on an ICMP Echo Request. Both this probe and probe 15 must return to set values in the IE
test.
15. A valid ICMP Echo Request, the Code field is set to 0 this time. Both this probe and probe
14 must return to set values in the IE test.
16. A UDP packet with ascii character “C” repeated 300 times in the data field. Sent to a closed
port. This sets U1 field.
2.2 Formal Definition
Assume NMAP is attempting to compare a measurement to a particular reference signature in
the NMAP database. We define Ri = 1 if received response to probe i. Ri = 0 otherwise. We also
define R′i = 1 if db signature expects response to probe i. R
′
i = 0 otherwise. Basically, we’re just
defining whether the probe came back and whether or not it was supposed to come back.
NMAP cares not only about whether probes came back, but what information it can obtain
based on those probes coming back. These discrete pieces of information are called features; for
example, what TCP Options were enabled on the target response to our probe. We define Fij =
feature j in response to probe j. We further define F ′ij = feature j db signature expects in response
to probe j. Note that because these features must be derived from responses to NMAP probes we
have Ri = 0 =⇒ F = {Fij = ∅ : ∀j ∈ Fi} as well as R′i = 0 =⇒ F ′ = {F ′ij = ∅ : ∀j ∈ F ′i}.
Sometimes NMAP cannot derive a feature based on the probe responses it receives, other times
the database doesn’t define what value a received feature is supposed to have. There is no penalty in
either of those cases in the event of feature mismatch. Therefore define indicator variable Zij = 1
if Fij 6= ∅ and F ′ij 6= ∅. Zij = 0 otherwise.
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NMAP attempts to Fingerprint an OS both based on which probes it responds to and how it
responds to those probes. It defines a global weighting both for whether the probe response pattern
matches, as well as whether the features derived from the probe responses match what is in the
NMAP DB. We define wi as the weight assigned to whether Ri matches R′i. We also define wij as
the weight assigned to whether Fij matches F ′ij .
So far, everything is reasonably straightforward. However, NMAP defines certain conditions
that warrant special exceptions in an attempt not to unfairly penalize a system for not matching.
For example, certain probes must be sent to an open port. If NMAP cannot find an open port it will
not send certain probes and, therefore, won’t include the weighting for a mismatch. Thus we define
indicator variable Yi = 0 for i ∈ 1, 7, 8, 9, 13 if no open port found and Yi = 1 for i ∈ 1, 7, 8, 9, 13
if an open port is found.
Note that indicator Yi = 0 for i ∈ [2, 6] as NMAP assumes that a target system will treat the
first 6 probes the same. We also have Yi = ¬R′i for i ∈ [14, 16] as NMAP only assigns probe
response weight to the ICMP and UDP probe responses if and only if it doesn’t not expect these
probes to return. Thus a target system may be penalized if these probes return, but NMAP wasn’t
expecting it to. If NMAP was expecting these probes to return and they do not, there is no penalty.
Yi = Ri otherwise as for the remaining probes, the various probes sent to closed ports, there is
no penalty if they do not return. It is not always clear whether or not all the ways that indicator
variable Yi is set is intentional.










2.3.1 More Features, More Problems
The way the NMAP classifier works can lead to unintuitive results. For instance, in certain
cases, adding measured features can reduce the effectiveness of NMAP in correctly identifying an
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operating system. Consider the following reduced example where we are scanning a hypothetical













In this circumstance, the measurement will perfectly match “X” with a confidence score of 1.0 as




Now, this signature matches with confidence score 1.0 for both “X” and “Y.” We can no longer
differentiate between the two entries in the database. Adding a feature to the measurement reduced
the effectiveness of the classifier.
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Name Windows Tomato SYN Only Windows Match Points
SP FC-106 ∅ FF 25
GCD 1-6 ∅ 1 75
ISR 108-112 ∅ 110 25
TI I ∅ I 100
TS A ∅ A 100
O1..O5 M4ECNW8ST11 ∅ M4ECNW8ST11 100
O6 M4ECST11 ∅ M4ECST11 20
W1..W6 2000 ∅ 2000 90
DF Y Y Y 20
TG 80 40 80 15
S O O O 20
A S+ S+ S+ 20
F AS AS AS 30
RD 0 0 0 20
Q "" "" "" 20
R1..R16 1111111111111111 1000000001100000 1111110000000000 540
Table 2.2: Comparison of Windows and Tomato Signatures against the same Windows machine
when behind a SYN-Only Firewall.
2.3.2 Tomato Router
The Tomato router happens to be an incredibly confounding signature when faced with a SYN
only firewall. We can demonstrate this by calculating the NMAP confidence score for a typical
“Windows 10” signature against both itself and against Tomato when faced with a Firewall that
only allows valid SYN packets through (without the ECN flag). As many features don’t make
it back, I will simplify the signatures to only show relevant fields because non-existent features,
due to probe non-response, don’t carry a penalty. However, for completeness, the full signatures
will be reproduce in the appendix: Tomato in Appendix A.2 and Windows 10 in Appendix A.3. I
also construct a signature from the Windows signature under the assumption that it is blocked by
Firewalls. For all probes that come back, the relevant features remain. For probes that do not make
it back, the features are not listed. Where are range exists, a value approximately within the center
of the range is picked.
When looking at Table 2.2 a few things are immediately striking. First, Tomato has an awful
lot of null fields. Looking back at the Formal NMAP definition in Section 2.2 we can see that null
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fields essentially act as wild-card fields because there is no penalty for failure to match. We can
see that of the fields remaining, the only fields where Windows matches itself but Tomato does
not is the “TG” field, which is only worth 15 points for matching. Meanwhile, the Response/Non-
Responsiveness to NMAP probes is worth a whopping 540 points. Further, even just eyeballing it,
we can see that Tomato is closer to the simulated SYN-Only Windows measurement than the ac-
tual Windows signature simply because Tomato matches the probe response pattern that Windows
exhibits when it’s behind a Firewall.
When actually using the Formal NMAP definition to calculate confidence score for matches
we get a confidence score of 0.8321 for Tomato but only 0.6393 for Windows. This despite the fact
that we are still scanning the same Windows machine, simply behind a Firewall. This confounding
effect is actually quite severe for the Tomato signature and may, in fact, be severely polluting the
results of actual NMAP scans on the open internet. For example, during an internet wide OS
Fingerprinting scan using NMAP, [18] found that 21% of all hosts scanned had Tomato appear as
a potential OS candidate. Given the relative obscurity of the Tomato OS, and the above example,
it is clear that confounding signatures can pose a severe problem for NMAP.
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3. NEMESIS DATABASE REDUCTION AND DIMENSIONALITY
Our preferred metric for determining OS Fingerprinting performance is the dimensionality of
the underlying database. The higher the performance, the larger the dimensionality. Using this
as a metric allows us to evaluate the effects of distortion and confounding signatures on the per-
formance of the database. For example, the Tomato router mentioned in Section 2.3.2 is clearly
confounding, but how big of an effect does it have on NMAPs performance? To answer these
sorts of questions we propose the Nemesis Database Reduction Framework. This Framework is
Fingerprinter agnostic, that is, the technique will work with any underlying OS Fingerprinting
system. The only things that are Classifier dependent are the number of signatures in the underly-
ing database, a technique for distorting them (if applicable), and a way to determine what OS the
Classifier believes the fingerprint belongs to (whether it self-matches or not). We can then elimi-
nate undesirable signatures until we are left with the reduced database. The remaining number of
signatures in the database constitute the dimensionality of said Classifier.
In general, there are two different categories of signature that we may wish to eliminate: con-
founding signatures and weak signatures. A confounding signature is one that, no matter what
signature is simulated, the Classifier will claim it matches against the confounding signature. A
weak signature is one where it fails to match against itself when simulated.
When running a DB reduction, a matrix of num_signatures × num_signatures is created
with each value being initialized to zero. Each signature in the Classifier database is then simulated
and passed into the Classifier. Each signature in the db is labeled as an integer [0, n). Matrix value
(simulated_signature, top_match_signature) is then incremented by 1. In the event that there
is a tie for the top match, each matrix value with a top match is incremented. If each signature
matched itself and only itself we would have a matrix with a perfect series of ones along the
diagonal. If a signature is confounding and will match against any simulated signature, it would
have a perfect column of ones. If a simulated signature is weak, it will let many signatures match
against it and have a row of ones along its row. See figure 3.1.
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Other signatures matching self (weak signature) 
Figure 3.1: Nemesis Reduction Matrix





After generating the reduction matrix and calculating the confound score for each signature,
the signature with the largest confound score is dropped, as long as said signature is above the max-
imum confound threshold. Once a signature is dropped, a new reduction matrix is generated and
the process is repeated until there are no more signatures left above the confound threshold. After
dropping the confounding signatures, we move on to dropping weak signatures. The weakness





Like before, we generate the reduction matrix and calculate the weakness score for each signa-
ture. If the maximum weakness score is greater than the drop threshold, it is dropped, we generate
the new reduction matrix and repeat the process until there are no more signatures above the thresh-
old. The final number of signatures left in the database is the dimensionality of the classifier.
While the above technique does work with any classifier, it does require that certain classifier
specific components be built to actually run useful tests. As NMAP is the de-facto standard for OS
Fingerprinting, we choose to build said components to target it and demonstrate the usefulness of
our dimensionality reduction technique.
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4. NEMESIS NMAP CORE
As mentioned in Section 3, the Nemesis Reduction tool depends on a Classifier specific im-
plementation that can feed it certain data and perform various distortions. The Nemesis NMAP
Core handles most of the NMAP specific tasks like generating valid signatures from the database,
distorting said signatures, and calculating NMAP confidence scores.
The NMAP Core is built around actual NMAP code from the NMAP Open Source repository.
The NMAP OS Classifier, NMAP DB Parser, and their dependencies were isolated from the full
source code, and the NMAP Core was built around them. Generating valid signatures with no
distortion is relatively straightforward. For fixed field features, the value is simply copied; if there
are multiple values with an OR, the first value is chosen. In the event that the feature is a range,
then the midpoint of the range is chosen. That being said, there is a catch. Certain fields are only
available under certain circumstances. The TG feature (Time to Live Guess) is only available if
the UDP probe did not return. Thus, for a “no distortion” signature this field must be filtered out.
There are three fundamental distortions: probe packet drops due to Firewalls, network jitter
distorting values that depend on RTT, and deliberate distortion of OS features. Even the simplest
distortion to model, Firewall drops, is somewhat difficult to model. NMAP has 17 well defined
probes which are transmitted to the target machine. For any given probe, all the dependent features
must be identified and either dropped or “un-dropped” while the probe response flag is set to
false. This means that all the fields on the relevant probe line, see Figure 5.1, need to be dropped,
save for the probe response field R is set to N. Again, there are a few additional special features
located on different signature lines that are nonetheless dependent on multiple types of probes. The
way NMAP Core handles this is by first generating a “clean” signature with all features properly
simulated and no features pre-maturely dropped. Then, based on user input defining the probability
of Firewall drop for each probe, a coin is flipped to determine whether or not a given probe is
dropped. Then based on the results, the appropriate features are removed.
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4.1 Feature Distortion
4.1.1 Picking Reasonable Values
Feature distortion is considerably more involved than merely dropping probes. In particular,
how does one pick reasonable distort values for the features being distorted? There are a few
possible distortion strategies.
Define i as the reference signature we wish to distort and j as any other reference signature in the
NMAP database.
1. Uniform: For each field we wish to distort in i we uniformly at random choose a valid value
in the range.
2. Uniform Plausible: For each field we wish to distort in i we choose a random j and replace
the relevant field in i from the same field in j. If the field in j is the same as the one in i,
choose a different j.
3. Unstable Patch (naive): For a given i, first choose a random j. Then, for each field we wish
to distort, replace the relevant field in i from the one in j.
4. Unstable Patch: For a given i, first choose a random j. Verify that, for each field we wish to
distort, j has a different value. If it does not, keep randomly picking different j until this is
the case. Then, for each field we wish to distort, replace the relevant field in i from the one
in j.
5. Stable Patch: Ahead of time, for every i in the NMAP database, create a mapping to a j
where there does not exist any overlap in the fields between i and j. If this is not possible,
pick the j with the least overlap with i. When we wish to distort a given i, pick the j based
on the established mapping and, for each field we wish to distort, replace the relevant field
in i from the one in j.
It’s clear from the list above that there are many possible user distortion models. In particular,
we chose distortion model 5, stable patch. The reason being that we can reasonably compute
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this ahead of time, while also getting good, valid, distort values. The patch generator finds stable
mappings for each NMAP signature i.
The basic operation is quite simple. For each signature i in the NMAP database we identify
which features it contains. Then we construct a set candidates which contains every signature j in
the NMAP database whose features are a superset of the features in i. We then find the signature j
that has the least overlap with i; that is, the signature j that i has the lowest match score against. In
the event that there is a tie amongst signatures with the lowest match score against i, one of those
signatures is chosen at random.
There are, however, practical considerations. There are many fields that have low entropy as
shown by Figure 4.1. Therefore there are some fields that are not only unlikely to have a patch
candidate, but due to their low entropy, are unlikely to have much useful signal anyway. We thus
allow the patch candidate system to exclude fields when searching for candidates. In general, when
running the patch system as part of NMAP DB Reduction (see section 3) we exclude all fields not
under distortion as we do not need a candidate for them anyway. When running as a standalone
application, we tend to simply exclude the low entropy fields (see section 4.1.3): [CC, CD, II, Q,
R, RD, RID, RIPCK, RIPL, RUCK, RUD, SS, UN, O, S, A, F].
4.1.2 Running the Distortion
Once we have a patch signature p generated for each signature in the database x, we know
have a reasonable set of values to distort the features into. Before running a distortion, we first
specify the probability that any particular feature is distorted; For example, the Time-To-Live (T)
feature or the Options feature. We group features together by type. So, for instance, if the user
sets a 20% probability of distorting the Window size (W), there is one coin flip, with 20% chance
of heads, and if the coin is heads all of the W features are distorted. This is because we assume
that a feature won’t be distorted on a per NMAP probe basis but on a machine wide basis. Thus,
all NMAP probes should experience the same distortion. There is also a slight inter-dependency
between the TCP Options (O) feature and the Timestamp (TS) feature. In particular, if the TCP
Options are distorted such that they do not have a Timestamp as part of the options string, then the
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TS feature must be set to ‘U’ meaning unsupported. This dependency check happens after the coin
flips and before the distortion. In addition, the Time-To-Live Guess (TG) feature is considered a
Time-To-Live (T) feature; this is because the existence of these two features is mutually exclusive
and depends entirely on whether the U1 (UDP probe to closed port) comes back. In the event it
does exact TTL calculation may be performed; if not a slightly less precise estimate must take
place. In the end, however, both T and TG are attempting to measure the same underlying property
of the OS.
4.1.3 Which Fields Are Worth Distorting?
The NMAP database contains many different features. However, it is reasonable to assume
that not all of those features carry useful signal when attempting to differentiate amongst various
Operating Systems. One possible way to help narrow down which fields provide useful data is by
looking at the entropy of the values of the fields in the NMAP database. It is clear from Figure
4.1 that fields SP, ISR, OX, and WX have the highest entropy. Note, however, that ISR and SP are
ranges and that Figure 4.1 treats different ranges as different values, even if they overlap. Thus,
excluding SP and ISR, it is clear that TCP Options (OX) and TCP Window Size (WX) contain the
most amount of entropy in the database and should therefore be able to provide the most amount
of differentiability. Note that the number of available features is restricted when firewalls are in
existence.
While certain features may have high entropy, they may not convey as much signal as expected
due to the way they may correlate with other features. For example, the TS field is dependent on
the value in the OX field. If timestamp is not specified as one of the available options, then the
TS field must be set to ‘U’ for unsupported. Thus, to consider how much value each field actually
provides, we can look at a the results from a simulation. We first configure a Firewall operating
under the SYN-Only case, all other packets have a 100% chance of being dropped. We set the
maximum confound (column) threshold to 0.0225 (threshold determined in Section 6.2). After
that reduction is complete, we then run a weakness (row) reduction with maximum threshold of
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Figure 4.2: Signature selfmatch average when only one feature is distorted in the RAC SYN case
with 0.0225 confound maximum. Features that do not affect selfmatch truncated.
distorted. Looking at figure 4.2 it may not come as much of a surprise that distorting TCP Options
(OX) carries a strong effect; though it is certainly surprising how important IP ID Generation (TI) is
to ensuring a correct self-match. This is almost certainly due to a reasonably heavy weight on ‘TI’
as well as the fact that certain OS Families have rather distinct ‘TI’s’: MS Windows increments up
by 256 in little-endian.
From Section 5 we know that there are several common possible Firewall scenarios. We thus
can look at the effect of distorting a given feature in less restrictive environments than in the SYN-
only case. As more features survive the Firewall, we would expect to see more features play a role
in the Fingerprinting of the OS. As such, we can rerun the above experiment with progressively
more permissive Firewalls: consult Appendix B for the Firewall configurations. As before we
run the simulations with a confound reduction first, with the maximum confound threshold set to
0.001 this time, followed by a weakness (row) reduction with threshold of 0.20. We look at the
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Figure 4.3: Signature selfmatch average when only one feature is distorted under various Firewall
scenarios. Features that do not affect selfmatch truncated.
we can see that, as before, the top 4 most import features are the same: TCP Option (OX), TCP
Window Size (WX), TCP IP ID Generation (TI), and Timestamp (TS). Note that the relative order
of importance for these features various somewhat with the Firewall configuration. Unsurprisingly,
a feature like ICMP IP ID Generation (II) only affects signatures when the Firewall actually allows
through ICMP packets. Overall, though, the vital features are generally quite similar between all
of the different Firewall types and, besides IP ID Generation (TI/II) and the overlapped values (SP,
ISR, GCD), they line up reasonably well with entropy in Figure 4.1.
4.2 Jitter
While local networks under low utilization may be expected to have reasonably consistent
Round Trip Times (RTT), the internet is under a constant state of flux. The internet operates under
a best effort model, and though packets usually make it to their destination, the RTT’s of packets
tend to have some level of variance. This causes problems for OS Fingerprinting tools that try to
derive information about how time-dependant algorithms in the OS Network Stack work. In the
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context of NMAP, there are generally two features it watches out for that depend on time. IP ID
Generation, and TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) generation.
From the NMAP reference guide, for the IP ID tests, there are 6 possible outcomes:
1. If all of the ID numbers are zero, the value of the test is Z.
2. If the IP ID sequence ever increases by at least 20,000, the value is RD (random). This result
isn’t possible for II because there are not enough samples to support it.
3. If all of the IP IDs are identical, the test is set to that value in hex.
4. If any of the differences between two consecutive IDs exceeds 1,000, and is not evenly
divisible by 256, the test’s value is RI (random positive increments). If the difference is
evenly divisible by 256, it must be at least 256,000 to cause this RI result.
5. If all of the differences are divisible by 256 and no greater than 5,120, the test is set to BI
(broken increment). This happens on systems like Microsoft Windows where the IP ID is
sent in host byte order rather than network byte order. It works fine and isn’t any sort of RFC
violation, though it does give away host architecture details which can be useful to attackers.
6. If all of the differences are less than ten, the value is I (incremental). We allow difference
up to ten here (rather than requiring sequential ordering) because traffic from other hosts can
cause sequence gaps.
7. If none of the previous steps identify the generation algorithm, the test is omitted from the
fingerprint.
Above list reproduced from [19, Chapter 8].
It is clear from the above, however, that the IP ID Generation feature is reasonably robust.
Though it does depend on time, the assumption is that the probes are sufficient close together in
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time that the ∆T ime between probes can be safely ignored. Indeed, the primary distortion of the IP
ID is likely to be how high of a load the target is under as IP IDs must be unique. If the target is
under extremely high load, the IP ID will be forced to tick up at an accelerated rate and may force
the NMAP OS Classifier to misidentify the IP ID generation algorithm.
Initial Sequence Number (ISN) feature identification, however, is considerably more compli-
cated than the IP ID generation as it relies on the timing between probes; in particular, the ∆T ime
for TCP Syn-Ack transmissions from the Target back to NMAP. The three fields that are used to
quantify the TCP ISN generation:
1. ISR: this quantifies the average rate that the ISN ticks up per unit of time.
2. SP: The variance in the rate that the ISN ticks up per unit of time.
3. GCD: The greatest common denominator of the ∆ISN . That is, the smallest value by which






Figure 4.4: NMAP measurements subject to jitter due to difference between True-Delta and
Measured-Delta.
Both ISR and SP values usually have a range, whilst the GCD tends to have a list of possible
acceptable GCD values. Note how NMAPs measurements of both ISR and SP (being dependent
on the time) make said measurements susceptible to network jitter. If we assume that there is zero
processing time between the receipt of an NMAP probe and the sending of a response, we can see
23
that the true ∆T ime between SYN-ACK responses is the transit time of B+C (shown in figure 4.4).
However, what NMAP is capable of measuring is the ∆T ime between C +D (also shown in figure
4.4). This isn’t a problem if the transit times don’t change between probes, but when network jitter
does occur it can throw off NMAP measurements.
4.2.1 Jitter Simulator
In principle, the fundamental idea behind the jitter simulator could be applied to any time
sensitive field for any OS Fingerprinting system. In this instance, however, we choose to build a
system to apply jitter to the NMAP Initial Sequence Number fields.
Once again, looking back at Figure 4.4 we can see that the problem of jitter occurs because our
measurement of Round-Trip-Time (RTT) isn’t necessarily the same as the actual RTT. The more
“Measured-Delta” diverges from “True-Delta” the worse the effects of network jitter on the feature
we are trying to measure. The first problem we run into is that there is no universally agreed upon
theoretical method of modeling network jitter [20, 21, 22]. That being said, we do not need a
perfect method of modeling network jitter, we only need a reasonable approximation of various
levels of jitter that may be experienced: low, medium, and high jitter. Finding a jitter model that
can accurately represent the internet as a whole in all circumstances is a bit outside the scope of
this work. Therefore, we choose to model one-way delays of a packet using a pareto distributed
random variable; reasonable parameters for said random variable where acquired from [23]. We
use this random variable to calculate the one way trip time for each NMAP ISN probe.
Given the one-way delay values of the NMAP probe, there is only one thing left to do before
we are able to calculate the distorted ISN values. We first must determine what the actual initial
sequence number would have been at the time of probe arrival. We can the measure what values
NMAP would calculate when it receives the responses to it’s probes. There is a slight trick here as
SP, ISR, and GCD are encoded in a slightly non-intuitive way (see Appendix C). Fundamentally,
though, as mentioned earlier:
1. ISR: this quantifies the average rate that the ISN ticks up per unit of time.
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2. SP: The variance in the rate that the ISN ticks up per unit of time.
3. GCD: The greatest common denominator of the ∆ISN . That is, the smallest value by which
the target increments its ISN value.
Therefore, to calculate the ∆ISN we simply need to take the average rate that the ISN ticks up
per unit time (ISR) and, on an alternating basis, either add or subtract the variance per unit time
(SP). Naturally, since both ISR and SP are usually given in ranges, we take their mean when using
them in calculations. We should now have two ∆ISN ’s. One where we add the variance to the
ISR and one where we subtract the variance from the ISR. For each probe we now assign a ∆ISN ,
alternating between the two possible ∆’s. We scale them by multiplying each by the calculated
“True-Delta”s. Each “True-Delta” can be calculated by taking the one-way delays and adding them
together; that is, calculating the last time since a simulated probe arrived (consult Figure 4.4). We
now divide each ∆ISN that each probe has by the GCD, round it to the nearest integer, and then
multiply it by the GCD. We check to see if the calculated GCD between ∆ISNi and it’s predecessor
∆ISNi−1 matches the target GCD. If it does not, then increment ∆ISNi by the target GCD. Keep
repearting until the actual GCD between ∆ISNi and it’s predecessor ∆ISNi−1 matches the target
GCD. We now have the actual ∆ISN ’s our target system would have sent out.
Now we simply need to record what NMAP would have measured. This is relatively simple.
Take the ∆ISN ’s and use the one-way delay values again to calculate what the “Measured-Delta”
(see Figure 4.4) would have been for each probe and use that to calculate the SP, ISR, and GCD.
This should be as simple as taking the ∆ISN ’s and dividing them by their “Measured-Delta” time
and then calculating the mean and the variance. We now have our distorted ISR and SP values.
4.2.2 Effect of Jitter on RTT Sensitive Features
We know that the ISN related fields [SP, ISR, GCD] are susceptible to RTT jitter. While our
preferred metric for OS Fingerprinting systems is dimensionality, it is of interest to see how various
levels of jitter impact the ISN fields ability to stay within their respective ranges. That is, what level
of jitter is required to actually negatively impact those fields. For this we run the Jitter Simulator
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Scale Shape Iterations % Passed E[abs(X-Y)]
N/A N/A 1000 0.979698 0
1 1000000000 10000 0.971071 1.02E-09
1 2.59 10000 0.707468 0.806213
0.5 1.72 1000 0.570661 1.03003
0.27 1.25 1000 0.457493 1.77216
0.25 1.21 1000 0.446234 1.92068
Table 4.1: How often the [SP, ISR, GCD] fields match after being subjected to varying levels of
jitter.
(4.2.1) in a standalone mode; we generate the new [SP, ISR, GCD] values after being subjected to
jitter and then compare them against the original ranges to determine whether or not they are still
within range.
For the test the Scale and Shape parameters for the Pareto random variable were obtained from
[23], with the exception of [N/A, N/A] and [1, 1000000000] (using format [Scale, Shape]) as they
were meant to simulate no jitter and extremely low jitter, respectively. The results are evident
in Table 4.1. As is evident, even in the no-jitter case there are some fields that cannot match
themselves, just over 2%. This is likely because some fields cannot be matched in all scanning
circumstances and depend on the frequency of probes. For example, supposing a system that
incremented it’s ISN by 10000 once every 30 seconds. If all 6 ISN probes are sent within 1 second
of each other, the ISN counter will appear fixed. If they are instead sent every 30 seconds, the
count is accurate. As such, some signatures can only be matched against when the NMAP OS
Fingerprinter is set to extremely low aggressiveness i.e. paranoid mode. Looking at the extremely
low jitter case, which is meant to represent a Local Area Network, only 3% of signatures fail to
have a match. This is similar to the no jitter case and is likely that these signatures simply have
either unmatchable or nearly unmatchable ranges for the ISN generation fields.
Looking at the cases which are supposed to more realistically represent the internet in Table
4.1, it is clear that as the level of jitter increases, the less likely said signature is to successfully
discern the ISN generation fields. Indeed, in the particularly severe cases of jitter, the success rate
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falls to below 45%. As such, it is clear that jitter does have an effect on NMAP being able to
correctly discern ISN fields. That being said, it’s possible that these fields have a limited role to
play in actually fingerprinting an OS. As such, we will wish to evaluate how distorting these fields
will affect the dimensionality of the NMAP OS Fingerprinter.
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5. INTERNET WIDE FIREWALL PROBE
It is already clear from Section 2.3.2 that confounding signatures can be a big issue. Ideally
we would like to measure the effect that such signatures have on the dimensionality of the NMAP
OS Classifier; naturally, that requires a method of identifying such signatures. However, it is also
clear from the example in Section 2.3.2 that an awful lot of match points are contained within the
probe response pattern, which depends on Firewall parameters. As such, it is important to consider
our approach to modeling Firewalls on the open internet. We propose a rather simple model for
Firewalls: simply define the probability that any given probe is blocked. This models advantage is
in its simplicity, all we need to do is determine how likely an OS Fingerprinting probe is to come
back.
As a way to guide the firewall parameters in our Nemesis simulations, we ran a quick internet
scan to help provide some rough statistics on which NMAP probes will make it through, and which
NMAP probes will be blocked. A full list of publicly routable IPs as of January 30th, 2018 was
extracted from BGP tables provided by [24]. At that time there were 2865828579 routable IPv4
addresses on the internet. This list was then shuffled and a single TCP-SYN packet was sent via
port 80 to each IP in the list. If a SYN-ACK response was detected, that IP was marked alive. A
total of 65930168 signatures were marked live. A random coin flip with a 1% chance of heads was
flipped and, if heads, said live IP was hit by an NMAP scan. The single TCP-SYN packet would
be transmitted from a randomly selected IP from a pool of about 50 IPs. The NMAP scan would
also originate from a randomly selected IP from a different pool of about 50 IPs. The NMAP scan
assumed port 80 was open and port 81 was closed. All outgoing and incoming NMAP packets were
logged. Post-processing then allowed for the matching of outgoing probes and incoming responses
to identify the response rate for each type of NMAP probe across the wider internet. These results
can be found in figure 5.2. Notably, almost all valid TCP-SYN packets to an open port received a
response, even when the somewhat esoteric ECN flag is set. ICMP echo requests usually elicit a
response, even if an invalid code is set (code should always be 0 according to IETF standards [17]).
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Label Explanation
S Base NMAP probe to verify that port 80 is indeed open.
T1/X1 Valid SYN packet
X# Valid SYN packets (with varying options and window sizes).
T2 No flags set TCP packet.
T3 All flags set TCP packet (rainbow)
T4 TCP ACK packet to closed port.
T5-T7 TCP SYN packet to closed port with varying options.
ECN Valid TCP-SYN packet with Explicit Congestion Notification flag set.
IE-9 ICMP Echo Request with invalid code set (Code 9).
IE-0 ICMP Echo Request with valid code set (Code 0).
U1 UDP packet to closed port.
Figure 5.1: A brief explanation of the labels in figure 5.2
A TCP-ACK to a closed port is reasonably likely to elicit a response. Unsolicited UDP packets are
moderately unlikely to receive responses, as are TCP SYN packets to closed ports. Invalid packets
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Figure 5.2: Internet Wide NMAP Scan Probe Response Odds
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6. CONFOUNDING SIGNATURES AND THEIR EFFECTS
6.1 Visualizing a Confounding Signature
In Chapter 3 we talked about confounding signatures. As a way to concretely visualize the
Reduction Matrix, we display an example of said matrix in Figure 6.1. It is clear that in Figure
6.1(a), the no distortion case, most signatures manage to self-match creating a nice clean diagonal
line. Meanwhile, when a Firewall is deployed, as in Figure 6.1(b) blocking all packets except for
SYN packets (ECN flag allowed), we can see considerably fewer signatures matching as well as
evidence of a few confounding signatures (as evidenced by the horizontal lines).
Given the size of the NMAP Database and the resolution of the figures, it is not necessarily
obvious how many signatures are confounding. Nor can we reasonably derive information on how
these confounding signatures impact the dimensionality of the database.
6.2 How Many Signatures Are Confounding? What Effect Do They Have on Dimensional-
ity?
As mentioned before in Section 3 and shown in Figure 3.1 there are two different ways to
run reductions on the database: column-based (eliminate confounding signatures) and row-based
(eliminate signatures that fail to self match). We can use the column-based reduction to identify
the confounding signatures and remove them. This allows us to not only get an accurate count of
the number of confounding signatures, but it will allow us to use the new “clean” database and
use it in row-based reductions to determine the effect of confounding signatures on the dimen-
sionality of the database. Basically, we will be able to see count how many signatures will fail to
match themselves simply because a confounding signature will match against everything. Before
running a column-based reduction, however, we must first define the threshold for what counts as
confounding.
To visualize how confounding most signatures are we first run one iteration of Nemesis DB Re-
duction and dump the generated matrix. We can then sum up the column values and divide by the
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Figure 6.1: Nemesis Reduction Matrix under no distortion and under a SE firewall.
number of signatures in the database to calculate each signatures confounding score. After sorting
by descending confounding score we are left with figures 6.2. It is clear that the overwhelming ma-
jority of signatures have confounding scores below 0.001. There are, however, a distinct minority
of outliers with higher confounding scores.
While figures 6.2 are suggestive, they are insufficient when trying to decide on a confounding
score maximum threshold. As our true goal is to maximize the number of signatures that can
self-match themselves, we can simply run a binary search by either increasing or decreasing the
maximum confounding threshold and then following up with a weakness reduction. This, naturally,
depends on our assumption that the number of signatures surviving reduction is concave with
respect to the confounding threshold. After running said binary search on the S and SE Firewall
cases (consult Appendix B), we end up with figures 6.3. Figure 6.3(a) supports our assumption
that the number of surviving signatures is concave with respect to the confounding threshold. From
figure 6.3(b) we can see that the ideal confound threshold for a database confronted with firewalls
that only allow SYN packets through is 0.0225; for a firewall which also allows SYN packets with
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Figure 6.3: Amount of NMAP DB Signatures remaining after running a Column (Confound) Re-
duction, followed by a Row (Weakness) Reduction. Firewalls, either S or SE configuration, were
enabled.
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Max Confound Score Remaining DB Values Net Size
0.001 470 0.087784834
0.0225 587 0.109637654
Table 6.1: Share of signatures surviving a RAC Reduction given a SYN-Only Firewall and given
confound scores.
the ECN flag, we see that 0.001 maximizes the number of remaining DB signatures. Comparing
with Figure 6.2(d) we can see that this corresponds to the point where the SE database is beginning
to flatten out.
While using a search to tailor the maximum confound score to each firewall state does give a
benefit, we can see that simply being near 0.001 is generally close enough. For example, in the
SYN-only case consider Table 6.1. By adjusting the confound score, we do obtain about 100 more
signatures then if we used 0.001. However, this only corresponds to a 2% increase compared to
the original size of the database. This is also evident from Figure 6.3(b) and 6.3(c). Though the
confound score can have a profound impact, the benefits right around 0.001 are somewhat minimal
compared to the difference between 0.001 and, say, 0.5. Thus, given the computational expense
of such a search, we’ll generally stick to using 0.001 as the maximum confound score unless a
confound score matrix dump shows reason to believe the thresholds should be set differently.
Now having determined our thresholds, we can look at the number of confounding signatures
actually dropped, as shown in Table 6.2. We can see that in the no Firewall case, there are only
6 signatures that qualify as confounding and must be dropped. As we make the Firewall more
restrictive, the number of confounding signatures increases until we get to the most restrictive
Firewall state (SYN only, ECN flag forbidden) and the number of confounding signatures begins
to drop again. Based on our Firewall scan result in Figure 5.2 it is likely that there are simply
few signatures in the database that exhibit a probe response pattern wherein TCP SYN packets
return a response unless the have an ECN flag set. And given how important the probe response
pattern is to NMAP when determining whether a signature is a match, as show in Section 2.3.2,
fewer signatures with the same probe response patterns as the Firewall that the probes are subject
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Table 6.2: Number of Confounding Signatures dropped under various Firewall conditions. Consult
Appendix B for Firewall configuration explanations.
to implies less potential for signatures to be confounding.
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7. THE EFFECT OF FIREWALLS ON DIMENSIONALITY
7.1 Running Reductions
While a Column-Based reduction will remove confounding signatures from the database, we
are still left with weak signatures that are unable to match themselves. For this we use Row-Based
reduction (see Section 3). Of particular interest is how signatures survive under various Firewall
conditions. By looking at Figure 5.2 it is clear that internet firewalls will generally allow through
all of the TCP SYN packets, even if the ECN flag is set. Firewalls will also somewhat commonly
allow through ICMP packets and TCP ACK packets to closed ports (around 70% of the time). We
may thus run database reductions under all of the above firewall conditions (defined in Appendix
B).
For this we look towards Table 7.1. From here it is clear that even without any distortion or
firewall interference, approximately 10% of the signatures in the NMAP database end up failing
to be able to match against themselves reliably and are removed. Even when using one of the least
restrictive firewall settings, allowing in all valid TCP packets as well as ICMP packets and a TCP
ACK to a closed port results in just over 40% of the database being dropped. It is clear that, in it’s
default configuration, packet drops carry and enormous impact on the ability of NMAP to properly
detect fingerprint Operating Systems within it’s database.
We now wish to consider the impact of confounding signatures. That is, signatures that not






Table 7.1: Net size of Database after running a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under various
firewall conditions. Consult Appendix B for Firewall configuration explanations.
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Table 7.2: Net size of Database after running a Column-Based (confound) reduction followed by
a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under various firewall conditions
only match against themselves, but will match against most other signatures. Matching against
other signatures prevents those signatures from being able to fully self-match without interference.
We first run a Column-Based (confound) reduction (see Section 3) with a maximum confound
threshold of 0.001. We choose 0.001 based on Figure 6.2(d). We then run a regular Row-Based
(weakness) reduction on the remaining signatures. By comparing Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 it is
clear that confounding signatures have a profound effect when a firewall is in place. While there
is almost no difference in the number of surviving signatures when no Firewall is in place, 4880
vs 4872 for RAC (Row after Column reduction) vs Row-Only, when a Firewall only allows SYN
packets through, the database has more than 10 times as many surviving signatures when using
RAC. While the results aren’t quite as dramatic for the other cases, they are nonetheless significant.
Though, the more permissive the Firewall, the less significant the gains to using RAC. This is likely
because NMAP gives an outsize weighting to packet non-arrival. As such, signatures that match
the non-arrival pattern of the selected Firewall have a higher likelihood of being confounding.
7.2 Lowering the Weight Given to Probe Non-Responsiveness
The NMAP OS Classifier has a set series of weights associated with each DB feature. In
particular, one of said weights involves the receipt of a response to a given NMAP probe. For
the TCP SYN probes in particular, the weight associated with receipt or non-receipt of packets
is generally more than half of the weights of all the other features associated with that probe
combined. This means that a non-response to a probe has an enormous impact on whether or not
a signature is capable of matching itself. We see this not only in the example cited in 2.3.2, but
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Table 7.3: Net size of Database after running a Column-Based (confound) reduction followed by
a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under various firewall conditions with probe response weight
(R) set to 20.
also in Table 6.2 where the number of confounding signatures increases dramatically after adding
Firewall distortions. This weight decision is curious, especially in light of the fact that which
packets an operating system responds to is one of the most configurable features of an Operating
System in the form of Firewalls. In particular, on the internet, a system without Firewalls in place
is much more the exception than the rule. The use of such a heavy weight, therefore, is almost
certainly more of a hindrance than a blessing.
We can, however, investigate the effects of lowering this weight on the NMAP Classifier. To
do this, we can rerun the DB reductions under various Firewall conditions with new lower weights
for probe non-response. In this instance, we set the probe response weight to 20. For comparison,
most features have a weight around 20, whilst the usual probe response weight is set to 100.
The results of rerunning this test is detailed in Table 7.3. One thing that is immediately obvious,
especially in comparison with Table 7.2, is that there is considerably less of a penalty when the
classifier is faced with more restrictive Firewalls. In particular, we see no difference between the
cases where a Firewall allows Syn packets (with the ECN flag) and the case where those packets
and ICMP packets are allowed through. This implies that, the ICMP packet provides no useful
signal when classifying an Operating System save for whether or not said system will respond.
Notably, whether or not an OS will respond to an ICMP packet is much more likely to be governed
by Firewalls than by OS characteristics.
Also of interest is the effect of the lower weights on the no Firewall case. We can see that in the
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no firewall case, 4420 signatures survive when using a low probe response weight. When using the
default weights, the no firewall case yields 4880 signatures, as show by Table 7.2. The low R case
has a database about 10% smaller, as in this case, the level of responsiveness to probes is a valid
signal when trying to identify the operating system in use. This suggests that there is a modest
benefit to keeping the old R weights when scanning on, say, a local network where Firewalls are
not in play. That being said, given how widely deployed Firewalls are, and how much better
NMAP appears to perform in the Firewall case with a lower weight, the current R weight is almost
certainly set too high.
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8. FEATURE IMPACT ON DIMENSIONALITY
In Section 4.1.3 we briefly discussed the importance of various fields NMAP uses to Fingerprint
an OS. Here we will more closely evaluate the importance of those various fields by observing what
effect their distortion has on the dimensionality of the NMAP database. Given that we are primarily
concerned with OS Fingerprinting over the internet, we will primarily assume that the probes will
also be subject to Firewalls, thus restricting the features that make it through.
8.1 Reduction under Distortion
NMAP has a total of 29 unique features which may be distorted. We first begin by deciding
which combination of features we wish to distort. We can do this by analyzing the effects of
individual distortions on self-match averages on the reduced RAC SYN-only database. When
looking at Figure 4.2 it is clear that certain features, in particular, OX (options), TI (TCP IP ID
Generation), TS (Timestamp), and WX (TCP Window Size) have an out-sized effect on signature
matches. As such, we define distortion profiles in Table 8.1. We can now run a reduction of the
database while under various profiles.
We start by taking the already reduced DB under the SYN firewall (when having undergone
Column-Based reduction first), and proceed to run a Row-Based reduction on it. A few things are
Distort Profile Distorted Values
D1 WX, OX
D2 D1 + DF, T/TG
D3 D2 + TI
D4 D2 + GCD, ISR, SP
D5 D4 + TS, A
D6 D5 + S, F
D7 D6 + TI
D8 D7 + II
ALL ALL
Table 8.1: Distort Profiles which define which NMAP features will be distorted. Consult Appendix
A.1 for brief explanation of features.
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Distort Profile Remaining DB Values DB Size Reduction
20% D1 463 0.211243612
20% D2 439 0.252129472
20% D2 + jitter_a 371 0.367972743
20% D3 392 0.332197615
20% D4 366 0.37649063
20% D5 285 0.514480409
20% D6 276 0.529812607
20% D7 136 0.768313458
20% All 112 0.809199319
20% All + jitter_a 90 0.846678024
50% D1 454 0.226575809
50% D2 433 0.262350937
50% D4 346 0.410562181
50% D5 223 0.620102215
50% D6 213 0.63713799
50% All 2 0.996592845
Table 8.2: Number of Remaining Signatures in NMAP database after running Row-Based reduc-
tion with distortion profile and S Firewall. Column-Based reduction on S Firewall was run first
with 0.0225 as confound threshold.
immediately clear from Table 8.2. Firstly, Nemesis does appear to be appropriately distorting the
signatures as almost nothing survives the 50% all distortion. Second, it is clear that the features
identified in Figure 4.2 as being vital to signature matching are indeed crucial. We see this when
we use distortion profile D7, which distorts said features identified in Figure 4.2; the number of
remaining signatures in the database is only slightly higher then when all features are distorted. It
is also clear that, as more key features are distorted, the number of surviving signatures steadily
deceases.
By looking at table 8.3 we can see that our conclusions generalize to the case where SYN
packets with the ECN flag set are allowed, despite the fact that the starting database is almost 4
times larger. Just as before, distort profile D7 is almost the same as the all distort profile; we also
find a steady decrease in the number of matches as more features are distorted. Indeed, this trend
appears to generalize over a wide range of expected Firewall conditions. Looking at Table 8.4 we
can see that the number of entries remaining in the database are remarkably similar after using
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Distort Profile Remaining DB Values DB Size Reduction
20% D1 1777 0.183739091
20% D2 1659 0.237942122
20% D2 + jitter_a 1140 0.476343592
20% D3 1542 0.291685806
20% D4 1475 0.322462104
20% D5 1241 0.429949472
20% D6 1234 0.433164906
20% D7 1130 0.480937069
20% All 1073 0.50711989
20% All + jitter_a 509 0.766192007
50% D1 1782 0.181442352
50% D2 1657 0.238860818
50% D4 680 0.687643546
50% D5 374 0.82820395
50% D6 362 0.833716123
50% All 8 0.996325218
Table 8.3: Number of Remaining Signatures in NMAP database after running Row-Based reduc-
tion with distortion profile and SE Firewall. Column-Based reduction on SE only Firewall was run
first with 0.001 as the confound threshold.
Profile SEI Reduction SEIA Reduction N/A Reduction
D1 1204 0.474006116 902 0.751241037 1910 0.470767526
All 507 0.778505898 103 0.971594043 105 0.970906068
D7 622 0.728265618 167 0.95394374 263 0.927126628
Table 8.4: Number of Remaining Signatures in NMAP database after running Row-Based re-
duction with various distortion profiles and Firewall rules. Confound reduction done first with
applicable Firewall rules.
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distort profiles D7 and All. This strongly suggests that almost all of the useful classification signal
comes from the features listed in distort profile D7 amongst all of the firewall configurations. In
addition, even in the no Firewall case, it is clear from Table 8.4 the dimensionality of the database
in the D7 and All distort case are remarkably similar to the SEIA case. This further confirms that
the features distorted in D7 form the core features that provide almost all of the signal.
8.2 Distortion Caused by High Load
It is clear, looking at the dimensionality tests in Section 8.1 that the features identified in Sec-
tion 4.1.3 are, indeed, vital to correct Fingerprinting of an OS. While it is unlikely all of those
features would be distorted by chance on the open internet, like the Firewall distortions, distortions
caused by high server load are much more likely. The two main fields that are susceptible to such
distortion, as identified in Section 4.2, are the IP ID Generation method and the TCP ISN Feature.
We look at the effect of distortion on both fields in the high load case.
In the original IETF standards the IP ID field was required to be unique, though it is now only
required to be unique in contexts where IPv4 Packet Fragmentation has or may occur [25]. This
means that if IPv4 Packet Fragmentation is permissible the IP ID counter must change between
responses. In the context of NMAP, there is an underlying assumption that the IP ID field is not
time dependent but number of probes received dependent (that is, it only changes when a new
packet arrives) and that the target will not be receiving enough inbound traffic to quickly alter
the IP IDs. This assumption does not necessarily hold under high load conditions. Indeed, under
sufficiently high load where a server must be constantly changing IP IDs, NMAP will conclude
that the server IP ID generation protocol is Random (RD) under the rule, “If the IP ID sequence
ever increases by at least 20,000, the value is RD (random).” [19, Chapter 8]
Another anticipated effect of a server under high load is an increase in RTT Jitter which will
distort the TCP ISN Features. The reasoning being that a server under high load may not respond
to packets immediately, deferring until resources are available. Under a high load scenario, the
amount of time an OS will defer responding to a packet can be highly variable, depending on the
nature of the other requests and the order in which they were received.
44
Scale Shape DB Size Reduction on RAC
N/A N/A 587 0
1 1000000000 522 0.110732538
1 2.59 458 0.219761499
0.5 1.72 448 0.236797274
0.25 1.21 429 0.269165247
Table 8.5: Net size of Database after running a Row-Based (Weakness) reduction under various Jit-
ter Conditions (Scale & Shape define Pareto variable parameters). In all cases, IP ID was distorted
to Random (RD).
To test the effects of high load, we decide to look at how the dimensionality of the NMAP
Database is effected in the case where an S Firewall is already in place. To do this, we take the
already reduced NMAP database, after a column and row reduction, and subject it to distortion.
In particular, IP ID is always set to “Random” (RD) and we subject the TCP ISN fields to ever
increasing distortion. The result is Table 8.5. We see that there is basically no effect when distorting
only the IP ID as the database of 587 items is the same size as the dimensionality of the Database
when faced with only an S Firewall. As such, it is clear that the only effect from high load will
come from TCP ISN Jitter. Again looking at Table 8.5 we see that under the almost no jitter case,
we have a 11% reduction in dimensionality of the database. In the moderate jitter and severe jitter,
we have about a 20% and 27% reduction in the dimensionality of the database, respectively. It is
clear that network jitter can have a relatively large impact on the dimensionality of the database,
even under almost perfect network circumstances. Given the sensitivity of the performance of
NMAP to jitter, it makes sense to consider whether or not the ISN parameters are either weighted
too heavily or whether the acceptable ranges for the ISN values should be widened to more easily
accommodate said network jitter.
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9. ZSIGNATURE EMULATOR
While the main thrust of this work is to build a Framework to evaluate OS Fingerprinting
Systems using dimensionality, the primary motivation to do so is to assist in the development of
tools and methods for reliable internet scale OS Fingerprinting scans. In that vein, zSignature
helps lay the foundations for development of future such tools. When zSignature is started up, it
reads in an NMAP DB file and loads it into memory. The simulator may be configured to either
simulate a single signature, or it may simulate the whole range of NMAP signatures by assigning
each simulated signature to an IP address. When NMAP sends a probe to an IP address bound
to zSignature, the simulator identifies the incoming NMAP probe and responds as defined by the
relevant reference signature. zSignature is quite similar to another tool HoneyD [26]. Though,
while HoneyD attempts to simulate a whole network of fake machines, zSignature attempts to
accurately emulate a single machine.
The underlying implementation of zSignature is generally quite simple. A custom network
driver captures all incoming packets on select IP addresses, the packets are identified as belonging
to NMAP or not. If they belong to NMAP, the probe type is identified and appropriate response
packets are crafter. Otherwise the packet is dropped. zSignature assumes that all incoming packets
are either NMAP probes or invalid packets. With this assumption, it is generally quite easy to
identify particular NMAP probes as they are quite distinctive. The first six NMAP TCP probes
have differing TCP options and window field values. The T2-T7 probes have various different
flags set, whereas the UDP and ICMP probes are distinctive in that they are not TCP packets.
While this is clearly not a general approach to simulating machines that can be used with other OS
Fingerprinting Systems, this is sufficient for a proof of concept.
The responses to most probes, in particular the T2-T7 probes, are mostly checking for fixed
field responses to the probe or are otherwise checking for responsiveness. For reference signature
values with a range, the average of the range is returned in the response packet. For values with
a list of values separated by a “logical or” the first value is returned. Given how fixed some of
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the fixed fields are, proto-packets with most of the features already set can be created from the
NMAP Database, with almost all of the remaining features crafted stateless upon the arrival of
a probe. Indeed, the few fields that require state to be kept between probes are: Timestamp and
Initial Sequence Number Fields. Timestamp requires state as it’s value is incremented at some
frequency per second, while the Initial Sequence Number Fields specify how fast the ISN is being
incremented per second, as well as it’s GCD and variance.
The main improvement of zSignature of HoneyD is the way that TCP Initial Sequence Num-
bers are generated. In particular, HoneyD does not guarantee that it’s standard deviation will be
within the expected NMAP range over the span of 5 probes. Whereas our implementation of ISN
generation, specified in Section 4.2.1, is much more likely to match the expected standard deviation
if the jitter is low enough. The reason for this is that HoneyD uses a Random Number Generator
to create the standard deviation in it’s ISN’s. While this should lead to good results over a large
amount of probes, it does not guarantee that the standard deviation will be as expected in a fixed
number of probes. A more targeted algorithm solves this problem.
A few minor complications cropped up when building zSignature. The first issue is that, to
properly craft response packets to NMAP probes, more detail than usual was necessary. In partic-
ular, we had to craft packets with our own IP IDs, etc. We also did not wish the system Firewall
to drop NMAP probes. Thus, we used a custom networking driver to directly capture the network
packets off of the network card before Windows had a chance to really process them. Once we cap-
tured our packets and pushed them up into the userspace of zSignature, they were removed from
the Windows packet processing pipeline so that Windows would not even be aware of said packets.
A similar process was repeated when writing packets. zSignature packets would go directly from
userspace to the networking driver, writing it to the network, again bypassing the Windows net-
working stack. zSignature was given an IP range that it was responsible for and this was how the
networking driver determined which packets to filter and which to allow to pass to the Windows
networking stack. Packets within the zSignature range were filtered, the rest passed to Windows.
An interesting problem cropped up with this arrangement. zSignature would have one IP ad-
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dress per simulated signature. Thus it needed slightly over 5000 IP Addresses. When running
under Windows Server 2016, however, it emerged that Windows was not capable of being as-
signed this many IPs. Once a mere 1000 IPs were assigned the CPU utilization of said server
climbed to 100% and stayed there until either the IPs were unassigned or the network card was
disabled. Some quick experiments confirmed that as the number of assigned IPs increased, the
CPU utilization increased. This was verified on multiple Windows Server 2016 machines. Thus
we decided on a workaround. Because packets sent to one of those 5000 IPs would not actually
interact with Windows anyway, there was no need for Windows to be aware of those IPs in the
first place. The only real reason we needed those IPs to be assigned was to ensure that Windows
would transmit the appropriate ARP packets to ensure packets addressed to those IPs were routed
correctly. As such, we decided to intercept ARP packets ourselves and capture those asking about
IPs within the zSignature range and craft ARP replies ourselves. As such, the Windows networking




We have built a general framework for evaluating the effectiveness of OS Fingerprinting Sys-
tems and, as a proof of concept, focused on the current de facto OS Fringerprinting standard:
NMAP. The primary metric we use when evaluating OS Fingerprinting systems is dimensional-
ity. We also have a secondary metric, number of confounding signatures. In particular, as part of
our focus on dimensionality, beofre doing our actual dimensionality calculations we generally first
filter out confounding signatures.
For the NMAP OS Fingerprinter, in particular, confounding signatures mainly became a prob-
lem when faced with a Firewall. Due to the high weight that probe response carries, a signature that
was otherwise valid might better match a different signature whose probe response odds match that
of the Firewall; an example of this is shown in Section 2.3.2. We show in Section 6.2 that removing
confounding signatures has a highly positive effect on NMAP dimensionality. Even after remov-
ing confounding signatures, however, the NMAP database loses about 9% of its signatures even
without any distortion and 32% of its signatures when faced with a reasonably lenient Firewall.
After lowering the NMAP weight given to probe responsiveness in Section 7.2, we find that the
dimensionality of NMAP improves in all cases where a Firewall is present, though performance
does degrade in the zero distortion case. Given our results in Section 5 showing the prevalence of
Firewalls on the internet, we suggest that NMAP is much more suited for local OS Fingerprinting
than internet scale fingerprinting in its default state.
In addition to NMAPs sensitivity to Firewalls, the OS Fingerprinter also shows sensitivity to
network jitter. While NMAP generally focuses on fixed fields that would not change, regardless of
network conditions or server load, in Section 4.2 we identify specific features that may be impacted
by jitter. In particular, IP ID Generation as well as TCP Initial Sequence Number Generation are
impacted by network conditions. We describe in more detail the mechanism behind how jitter
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can distort those features and describe, in Section 4.2.1, a means of simulating distortion. We
show that such jitter can strongly impact the ISN Generation in particular. In Section 8.2 we
show that, while IP ID distortion tends not to have any meaningful impact on the dimensionality
of NMAP, distortion of the TCP ISN parameters caused by network jitter does have an impact
on dimensionality. While this effect is most pronounced under moderate to high network jitter
even extremely minor network jitter, like that found on a local network, is enough to hurt the
dimensionality of NMAP. This suggests that the way the TCP ISN generation fields are handled
may need to be rethought. It also further suggests that NMAP may struggle with internet wide
scans.
Finally we looked at which features contain the most signal, that is, which features NMAP
looked at were most important to be able to accurately identify an OS. We did this by looking at the
effect that distorting various features had on the dimensionality of the NMAP OS Fingerprinter. In
Section 4.1.3 we looked at the effect that distorting any individual feature had on the dimensionality
of NMAP. We concluded that TCP Options, Window Size, and Timestamp were highly important
fields because of their high entropy in the NMAP database. When looking at their individual effect
on the ability of any particular signature to match itself, we find that besides the above candidates,
TCP IP ID Generation stood out as a very important field. Upon closer consideration, we find that
the Windows OS Family, in particular, has a very distinctive way of handling IP ID generation,
which may help to explain why it carries so much more singal than its entropy would suggest.
Further, when looking at Figure 4.3 we see that the same features are generally important across
various Firewall conditions. When looking at the dimensionality of the NMAP database when
under the D7 distort condition, that is when the following NMAP fields are distorted [WX, OX,
DF, T/TG, TI, GCD, ISR, SP, TS, A, S, F, TI, II], we find that, even in the no Firewall case, that
NMAPs dimensionality drops close to zero. Given that these only represent half of the NMAP
fields, this suggests that there is considerable scope to reduce the number of probes NMAP sends
without sacrificing dimensionality.
Overall, we conclude that the Framework provides a useful metric for evaluating OS Finger-
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printing Systems under various conditions. We conclude that NMAP, the de facto OS Finger-
printing standard, in particular is ill suited to take on internet wide OS scans. This suggests that
considerable future work is necessary to either update NMAP to meet such a goal or that a new
tool must be built from scratch.
10.2 Further Study
Given our framework, we can explore more deeply several interesting questions in the future.
For example, we can more deeply study how many probes and tests can be eliminated without
sacrificing dimensionality. There is also great potential to study the weights NMAP assigns to
each feature. For instance, we only looked at the effect of reducing the weight of probe non-
response. Future works could develop a system which maximizes the dimensionality given the set
of weights NMAP has. Further effort could be deployed into seeing what effect Firewalls have on
ideal NMAP weights.
In addition, Nemesis DB Reduction could be used on other systems facing similar parameters
as NMAP did here in an effort to provide a head to head comparison of the dimensionality of
NMAP and said OS Fingerprinting systems like, for example, Plata [18]. zSignature could be
expanded upon into a more general tool that can be used to train new OS Fingerprinting systems
based on NMAP signatures. Alternatively, it’s advancements over HoneyD, like the TCP ISN
Signature generator, could be incorporated into HoneyD and the newly advanced system could be
used to train new Fingerprinting systems.
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A.1 NMAP Brief Feature Description
Below is a list of all the various NMAP features and a brief description of their meaning. A
more complete description is available at [16].
• A: Acknowledgment number tests, is it same as SEQ in probe? Zero? Other?
• CC: Explicit congestion is supported
• CD: Is IMCP Response Code 0 (correct) or echoed back from incorrect ICMP request
• CI: IP ID Sequence Generation Alogrithm based on responses from TCP requests to a closed
port.
• DF: Don’t Fragment bit, is it set?
• DFI: Don’t Fragment bit for ICMP, is it set? (N: no, S: echo DF of probe, Y: yes)
• F: TCP Flags in response
• GCD: TCP Initial Sequence Number greatest common divisor.
• II: IP ID Sequence Generation Algorithm based on responses from ICMP requests.
• IPL: Total length of ICMP Unreachable Response to UDP probe.
• ISR: TCP Initial Sequence Number counter rate. How quickly does ISN tick up?
• O: TCP Options (special note, this is almost always blank for any of the non-standard normal
TCP probes, usually only set for good TCP SYN or TCP SYN-ECN)
• Q: Special quicks in TCP stack
• R: Is a response expected to this probe?
• RD: Checksum of ASCII error message in RST packet. 0 is no such data
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• RID: In the ICMP Port Unreachable message (for UDP probe), is the IPID of the returned
UDP header unchanged?
• RIPL: Returned ICMP probe IP Total Length Value, is the value of the ORIGINAL IP Header
correct (returned in the ICMP Port Unreachable message)
• RUCK: In the ICMP Port Unreachable message (for UDP probe), is the UDP checksum of
the header unchanged?
• RUD: Integrity of the returned UDP data in the ICMP Port Unreachable Message. This
shouldn’t have been mangled.
• S: TCP Sequence Number test in relation to TCP Ack number from the probe that elicited
the response
• SP: TCP Initial Sequence Number variance.
• SS: Shared IP ID, is the IP ID Sequence shared between TCP and ICMP protocols?
• T: IP TTL value
• TG: IP TTL value "guess" when exact hop distance not known (occurs when no ICMP Port
Unreachable message comes from UDP probe)
• TI: IP ID Sequence Generation Algorithm, based on original 6 TCP SEQ probes.
• TS: TCP timestamp option algorithm
• UN: Unused port unreachable field nonzero (RFC mandates it should be zero)
• W: Initital window size
A.2 The Confounding Tomato
Reproduced below from the NMAP database is an example of the Tomato signature, which
tends to be extremely confounding for NMAP when NMAP is scanning targets behind firewalls:
# Linux 2.6.18-4-ixp4xx #1 Sun Apr 22 08:34:11 UTC 2007 armv5tel GNU/Linux, Debian on
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NSLU2
# Tomato USB Version 1.28 Tomato Firmware v1.28.7821 MIPSR1-Toastman-ND K26 MiniIPv6
- Linux kernel 2.6.22.19 and Broadcom Wireless Driver 5.10.147.0 updates
Fingerprint (2457) Linux 2.6.18 - 2.6.22















A.3 A Windows Signature
Reproduced below from the NMAP database is an example of a signature for the “Windows
10” Operating System:
# Windows 10, DC=D
# Windows 10 1607
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Fingerprint (3398) Microsoft Windows 10



















The following are the various Firewall configurations used throughout this Thesis.
• S: A Firewall that only allows valid TCP packets with the SYN flag set. All other probes are
dropped, including valid TCP packets with the SYN and ECN flag set. What this means for
NMAP, in particular, is that only the T1 and SEQ tests can be completed as they are the only
tests that use valid TCP packets with the SYN flag set.
• SE: The same as S except that valid TCP SYN packets with the ECN flag set are also allowed
through. This allows for the NMAP ECN tests to also be completed. It is clear from Figure
5.2 that valid TCP SYN packets with the ECN flag set are rarely blocked. Thus, this is almost
certainly the most common firewall configuration.
• SEI: The same as SE except that ICMP packets are now also allowed through the Firewall.
This includes the valid ICMP Echo requests as well as the (lightly) malformed ICMP Echo
request; an ICMP ECHO request must set the CODE field to 0, but because this field has no
other possible values in an ICMP ECHO request, few Operating Systems check this field.
The IE NMAP feature requires both ICMP packets to return for the ICMP tests to return
features. Further, we can see from Figure 5.2 that few Firewalls allow valid ICMP Echo
requests but block invalid ICMP Echo requests.
• SEIA: The same as SEI except that valid TCP packets with the ACK flag set sent to a closed
port are allowed through the Firewall. In this case, the expected response would be a TCP
packet with the RST flag set. This allows for the T4 test to be completed.
• N/A or ALL: All packets are allowed through the Firewall. That is, there if no Firewall in





Given a list of isnDelta’s and corresponding isnT imeDelta’s, we define the following. Note
that seq_rates and seq_rates2 are intermediate values defined by us to more easily calculate ISR
and SP, which are NMAP fields.
1. GCD: Simply the Greatest Common Denominator between all of the isnDelta’s.
2. seq_rates: Divide each isnDeltai by it’s corresponding isnT imeDeltai to get the seq_rates
array.
3. ISR: This is simply 8 ∗ log2(mean(seq_rates)) rounded to the nearest integer.
4. seq_rates2:  Divide each element in seq_rates by GCD GCD > 9The same as seq_rates otherwise
5. SP: This is simply 8 ∗ log2(std_dev(seq_rates2)) rounded to the nearest integer (where
std_dev is the standard deviation).
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